Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) System Health Assessment: Analysis of HST Health by Pandolf, John E. et al.
 NASA/TM-2005-213917/Version 1.0 
NESC-RP-04-12/04-060-E 
 
    
 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space 
Telescope (HST) System Health Assessment -  
Analysis of HST Health 
 
Steven J. Gentz, Brent N. Heard, Robert F. Hodson, Duane H. Pettit, and John E. Pandolf 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
 
John D. Azzolini, Cornelius J. Dennehy, Rodger E. Farley, and Frank J. Kirchman 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 
 
Peter D. Spidaliere 
NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
September 2005 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20050217100 2019-08-29T20:59:47+00:00Z
 The NASA STI Program Office . . . in Profile 
 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 
NASA Scientific and Technical Information (STI) 
Program Office plays a key part in helping NASA 
maintain this important role. 
 
The NASA STI Program Office is operated by 
Langley Research Center, the lead center for NASA’s 
scientific and technical information. The NASA STI 
Program Office provides access to the NASA STI 
Database, the largest collection of aeronautical and 
space science STI in the world. The Program Office is 
also NASA’s institutional mechanism for 
disseminating the results of its research and 
development activities. These results are published by 
NASA in the NASA STI Report Series, which 
includes the following report types: 
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
programs and include extensive data or 
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data and 
information deemed to be of continuing 
reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers, but having 
less stringent limitations on manuscript length 
and extent of graphic presentations. 
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 
and technical findings that are preliminary or of 
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, 
working papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
 
 
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected 
papers from scientific and technical 
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from NASA 
programs, projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having substantial 
public interest. 
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific and 
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission. 
 
Specialized services that complement the STI 
Program Office’s diverse offerings include creating 
custom thesauri, building customized databases, 
organizing and publishing research results ... even 
providing videos. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI Program 
Office, see the following: 
 
• Access the NASA STI Program Home Page at 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
• E-mail your question via the Internet to 
help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
• Fax your question to the NASA STI Help Desk 
at (301) 621-0134 
 
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at  
(301) 621-0390 
 
• Write to: 
           NASA STI Help Desk 
           NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 
           7121 Standard Drive 
           Hanover, MD 21076-1320
 NASA/TM-2005-213917/Version 1.0 
NESC-RP-04-12/04-060-E 
 
    
 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space 
Telescope (HST) System Health Assessment -  
Analysis of HST Health 
 
Steven J. Gentz, Brent N. Heard, Robert F. Hodson, Duane H. Pettit, and John E. Pandolf 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
 
John D. Azzolini, Cornelius J. Dennehy, Rodger E. Farley, and Frank J. Kirchman 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 
 
Peter D. Spidaliere 
NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration 
 
Langley Research Center   
Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199  
    
September 2005 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in the report is for accurate reporting and does not 
constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
 
 
 
 
Available from: 
 
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI) National Technical Information Service (NTIS) 
7121 Standard Drive 5285 Port Royal Road 
Hanover, MD 21076-1320 Springfield, VA 22161-2171 
(301) 621-0390 (703) 605-6000 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Consultation Position Paper 
Document #: 
RP-04-12 
 
Version #: 
1.0 
Title: 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
System Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health 
Page #: 
1 of 34
 
 
 
Technical Consultation 
of the 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
System Health Assessment - Analysis of HST Health 
 
 
 
 
 
August 24, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by: 
Steven J. Gentz 
NESC Principal Engineer 
 
 
 
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Consultation Position Paper 
Document #: 
RP-04-12 
 
Version #: 
1.0 
Title: 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
System Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health 
Page #: 
2 of 34 
 
Signature Page 
 
 
NESC Independent Technical Assessment Team 
 
 
 
Steven J. Gentz, NESC Lead John D. Azzolini, GSFC 
 
 
 
Cornelius J. (Neil) Dennehy, GSFC    Rodger E. Farley, GSFC 
 
 
 
Brent N. Heard, LaRC     Robert F. Hodson, LaRC 
 
 
 
Frank J. Kirchman, GSFC    John E. Pandolf, LaRC 
 
 
 
Duane H. Pettit, LaRC      Peter D. Spidaliere, JSC 
 
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Consultation Position Paper 
Document #: 
RP-04-12 
 
Version #: 
1.0 
Title: 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
System Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health 
Page #: 
3 of 34 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On July 13, 2004, the Associate Administrator for the Office of Exploration Systems, Admiral 
Craig E. Steidle, with concurrence from the Chief Safety & Mission Assurance Officer, Bryan D. 
O’Connor, and NASA’s Chief Engineer, Theron M. Bradley, solicited support from Ralph R. 
Roe, NESC Director, in the evaluation of the Hubble Space Telescope’s (HST) long-term health 
prospects.   
 
The NESC consultation was one component of an Agency decision on the viability of extending 
the life of the HST through a robotic service mission (SM).  To address the request within the 
specified parameters, a multi-Center review team of knowledgeable technical specialists was 
convened to analyze the current and anticipated state of spacecraft subsystems and the 
parameters that describe the HST health to determine the timeliness of a robotic SM and whether 
this type of mission is likely to provide the capability to extend the useful scientific life of the 
HST by 5 years.  The NESC team examined numerous HST Program reports and briefings, and 
the findings from the Independent Program Assessment Office (IPAO) and the Aerospace 
Corporation Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) as they related to the degradation of the HST’s 
health.  The NESC team also examined the state of HST subsystems that will not be serviced 
under the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) baseline concept (Appendix A) including, but 
not limited to, the Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) system, the Data Management Unit, the Multi-
Layer Insulation (MLI) blankets, and the main science instrument systems.  Appendix F provides 
HST illustrations. 
 
The technical disciplines used for this assessment were selected based on the consideration of the 
HST subsystems and included: Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C), Mechanical Systems, 
Power and Avionics, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA), Scientific Payloads, and Systems 
Engineering. 
 
The review of the IPAO and AOA documents was supplemented with a significant quantity of 
HST-related reports, presentations, and other applicable references.  A partial listing of these 
documents is located in Appendix C.  In addition, extensive technical discussions were held with 
the HST Program liaison, numerous HST Operations, Flight Systems Engineering, Systems 
Management personnel and team technical peers. 
 
By design and circumstances of limited time, the approach was concurrent discipline-based with 
selective subsystem penetration (audit structure).  This assessment method enabled rapid review 
of the diverse and formidable quantity of HST Program information, while allowing the 
identification of systemic as well as isolated system characteristics.  No specific attempt was 
made at independent verification of trending information, mathematical models, or performance 
parameters.  Aspects of information transfer from daily operations through HST Program review 
were included with the data review.  This allowed an examination of information flow to ensure 
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critical performance and health trends were identified and communicated through the decision 
chain. 
 
In summary, the NESC review team has assessed the HST Program to be: 
 
- organizationally structured to recognize performance deterioration and communicate 
these system changes through all levels of the Mission Operations, Systems Engineering, 
and Software (MOSES) team and HST Program Office; 
- a highly skilled personnel base to support both operations and sustaining engineering 
associated with a SM; 
- experienced in effective development and implementation of operational workarounds to 
provide the greatest likelihood of continued science until a SM can be effected (baring a 
rapid degradation in battery capacity); and 
- prepared with contingency plans to perform a power management protocol to maximize 
HST attitude control until a SM can be effected. 
 
After a thorough review of the information examined and the technical discussions held, it 
appears there is a high likelihood of having a viable vehicle available for a robotic SM.  In 
addition, following successful equipment and instrument replacement during an optimized SM, 
the potential for at least five additional years of science discovery is very good.   
 
Recommendations are provided to aid in the decisions that will lead to an optimum SM manifest 
and to extend the science service life its greatest extent. 
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NESC Position Paper 
Request Number #:  04-060-E 
Requestor Name: Craig E. Steidle Requestor Contact Info: Craig.E.Steidle@nasa.gov 
                                               202-358-1523 
Short Title: Hubble Space Telescope (HST) System Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health 
Degradation 
Description: To evaluate the long-term health of the HST through Year 2013 following a successful 
robotic servicing mission.  Specifically, to provide input on the predicted reliability/expected availability of 
the major subsystems and instruments.  Especially those subsystems and instruments not scheduled for 
servicing in the baseline concept.   
Date Received: 13 July 2004 Date Consultation Initiated: 13 July 2004 
Lead Assigned: Steven J. Gentz Lead Contact Info: Steven.J.Gentz@nasa.gov 
                                  757-864-9263 
Date Consultation Concluded: 12 August 2004 
 
Consultation and Assessment Team  
 
Last 
Name First Name Center Office Number Email 
Gentz1 Steven LaRC 757-864-9263 Steven.J.Gentz@nasa.gov 
Azzolini John GSFC 301-286-8480 John.D.Azzolini@nasa.gov 
Dennehy Neil GSFC 301-286-5696 Cornelius.J.Dennehy@nasa.gov 
Farley Rodger GSFC 301-286-2252 Rodger.E.Farley@nasa.gov 
Heard Brent LaRC 757-864-5021 Brent.N.Heard@nasa.gov 
Hodson Bob LaRC 757-864-2326 Robert.F.Hodson@nasa.gov 
Kirchman Frank GSFC 301-286-9292 Frank.J.Kirchman@nasa.gov 
Pandolf John LaRC 757-864-9624 John.E.Pandolf@nasa.gov 
Pellicciotti Joe GSFC 301-286-9292 Joseph.W.Pellicciotti@nasa.gov 
Pettit Duane LaRC 757-864-5224 Duane.H.Pettit@nasa.gov 
Spidaliere Pete JSC 281-483-9721 Peter.D.Spidaliere@nasa.gov  
McAlhaney Lisa LaRC 757-864-2139 Lisa.A.Mcalhaney@nasa.gov 
Herman Natasha LaRC 757-864-3811 N.M.Herman@larc.nasa.gov 
Kalinowski2 Keith GSFC 301-286-3369 J.Keith.Kalinowski@nasa.gov 
Schaffer3 Matt HQ - Code T 202-358-4240 Matthew.Schaffer-1@nasa.gov 
Duh4 Jen Chow (JC) HQ - Code D 202-358-2225 JCDuh@nasa.gov 
Sarsfield4 Liam HQ - Code D 202-358-1870 Liam.P.Sarsfield@nasa.gov 
Hwa5 Vicky HQ - Code B 202-358-4336 Vicky.Hwa@nasa.gov 
1Team Lead - NESC Principal Engineer’s Office 
2HST Liaison 
3Office of Exploration Liaison 
4Office of Chief Engineer Liaison 
5Aerospace Corporation AOA Monitor 
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In addition to outstanding support provided by the assessment team, the rapid response to this 
request could not have been accomplished without the exemplary support from the HST Program 
Office (Dr. Keith Kalinowski), the Lockheed Martin Corporation MOSES team (specifically, 
Tony Cruz, Mike Wenz, Stan Krol, Dave Haskins, Dan Smith, Mike Myslinski, Christine 
Cottingham, Greg Goulet, Jessica Regalado, Harry Wynn, Kevin Matthews, and Mike Prior), and 
the Space Telescope Science Institute representative (Manfred Miebach). 
 
Added appreciation is extended to the NESC Management and Technical Support Office 
(specifically Lisa McAlhaney, Natasha Herman, and Erin Moran). 
 
Consultation Approach 
The NESC conducted an abridged independent examination of available information and 
personnel interviews to evaluate the current and anticipated state of the spacecraft subsystems 
and the parameters that describe the HST’s health.  These examinations included the projected 
timeliness of a robotic SM and whether the GSFC baseline concept is likely to provide the 
capability to extend the useful scientific life of the HST by an additional 5 years.  The NESC 
team collected a broad spectrum of pertinent HST Program analyses, reports, briefings, and the 
results of the IPAO and the Aerospace Corporation AOA assessments as they relate to the 
degradation of the HST’s health. This review included the state of the HST subsystems having 
the potential to impact the viability of the HST, but will not be serviced under the baseline 
robotic SM.   
 
The identified documents were distributed to the NESC team for initial independent review and 
during a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) at GSFC (refer to Appendix D for the TIM 
agenda).  Concurrent with these reviews were periodic discussions with the HST Program 
Liaison for clarifications to information provided and requests for further reference material.  
The TIM enabled in-depth exchange of information internally to the review team and externally 
with the HST Program personnel.  In the course of these discussions and technical interchanges, 
additional reports and information were requested for review and evaluation.  Finally, the TIM 
allowed for the consolidation of the various technical discipline observations into a combined 
package for a stakeholder interim status review (refer to Appendix E). 
 
The following are the major milestones of the NESC assessment: 
 
Milestone Date 
Initial Stakeholder Meeting 13 July 2004 
Review Team Formulation 14 - 20 July 2004 
Review HST Operations and Performance Data Packages 14 - 26 July 2004 
Consultation Scope Definition 19 July 2004 
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Milestone Date 
Kickoff Teleconference 20 July 2004 
Status Teleconference with Stakeholders 23 July 2004 
GSFC TIM 28 - 29 July 2004 
Interim Status Briefing to Stakeholders 3 August 2004 
Final Report Submission 24 August 2004 
 
Data Reviewed 
The technical disciplines of GN&C, Mechanical Systems, Power and Avionics, S&MA, 
Scientific Payloads, and Systems Engineering were assigned review of their respective areas of 
expertise based on the following HST subsystem divisions: 
 
• Data Management 
• Electrical Power 
• Mechanisms* 
• Instrumentation and Communication 
• Optical Telescope Assembly 
• Science Instruments 
• Pointing Control 
• Thermal Control 
• Safing 
* Mechanisms is not typically listed as a separate subsystem for HST reporting 
 
In addition to the copious volume of information available, the method of information transfer 
was examined to determine if crucial information on the HST’s system health was adequately 
being disseminated from the MOSES team to the HST Program for review and disposition.  This 
included the procedures used in performance and anomaly identification, reporting, and tracking. 
 
OBSERVATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following are three main areas pertaining to Hardware, Operating Culture, and Reliability 
Analysis. The recommendations are sequentially numbered to aid discussion.  
 
HARDWARE 
 
Observations 
• A number of components have longevity exceeding specification life.   
This appears to be a combination of conservative reliability analysis assuming highly 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Consultation Position Paper 
Document #: 
RP-04-12 
 
Version #: 
1.0 
Title: 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
System Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health 
Page #: 
8 of 34 
 
stressed components; quality parts screening (Grade B/NASA PPL-21 Grade 2), 
fabrication, and test; infant mortality culling; and refined HST operations to minimize 
degradation (especially to components with known performance concerns). 
 
• The HST architecture appears robust with considerable redundancy and has proven to 
be adaptable to unforeseen configurations. 
• The following components have been identified as having performance issues or 
require additional emphasis by the HST Program Office: 
 
- Nickel Hydrogen Batteries 
The HST batteries continue to have decreased capacity at a calculated total 
system rate of -34.2 AmpHour per year (-5.7 Ahr per battery per year).  At this 
projected rate, the system capacity is predicted to fall below the lowest 
Safemode trigger of 110 Ahr at the end of 2009.  Unless changes in the 
recharging and reconditioning procedures are validated to impede this trend, 
battery capacity will remain one of the two most likely system limiters for the 
HST.  It is the principal factor in the overall observatory life projections prior to 
a SM. 
- Rate Sensor Unit (RSU) Gyroscopes 
Currently, RSU gyroscopes 3 and 5 have failed with gyroscope 6 held in reserve 
with known bias instability performance issues.  To support nominal pointing 
control to the desired accuracy requires at least three functional gyroscopes.  
Reliability estimates are for a greater than 50% probability of having three 
gyroscopes until the beginning of 2006.  The HST Program is developing a two-
gyroscope pointing and science scheduling capability in advance of the 
anticipated loss of three functional gyroscopes.  Continued science observations 
are projected for an additional 12 to 18 months beyond the loss of a three-
gyroscope capability using software corrections for the known performance 
issues of gyroscope 6, and the implementation of a two-gyroscope operational 
mode.  Gyroscope life is the principal factor for observatory useful science life 
projections and the other most likely system limiter for the HST prior to a SM. 
 
- Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs) 
Three FGSs provide precise fine-pointing adjustments to tracking guide stars at 
sub-arcsecond levels with only two functioning FGSs required for nominal 
science operations.  There is concern with the performance of FGS 2R and FGS 
3.  The effectiveness of FGS 2R is decreasing as a result of a servo-loop gain 
issue that is most probably due to anomalous Light Emitting Diode (LED).  
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FGS 3 has significant bearing performance issues that require higher motor 
torques to overcome, and is being used sparingly to preserve remaining life.  
Life predictions for adequate FGS control vary, but appear to provide sufficient 
margin to the projected SM in 2008, but not to the planned end-of-life in 2013.  
Replacement of the FGSs was in the Orbiter SM, but is not in the baseline 
GSFC robotic SM. 
 
- Pointing/Safemode Electronics Assembly (PSEA) Safing Computer 
Daily temperature monitoring and long-term trending show the PSEA safing 
computer operating at the yellow high limit (49°C).  The mean and maximum 
temperatures for the first quarter of calendar year 2004 were 40.35 and 48.29°C, 
respectively. The red high limit for this system is 54.5°C.  The HST Program 
expects to initiate ground testing of a PSEA engineering unit to validate the 
current yellow and red high limits.  The results of this testing may lead to an 
increase in the warning limits or may require operational controls to preclude 
limit violations. 
 
- Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) 
The STIS was installed on 14 February 1997 during SM 2.  In the course of this 
assessment (3 August 2004), the STIS transitioned into a suspend mode.  
Preliminary findings by the Failure Review Board indicate a problem with the 
Side 2 +5 volt Interpoint power converter in the Mechanism Power Supply.  
This suspected fault is similar to an electrical malfunction that occurred in May 
2001 that rendered the Side 1 electronics inoperable. 
 
• The following cross-cutting system aspects have potential concerns: 
 
- Total Ionizing Dose (TID) exposure of component electronics. 
The HST Program provided a technical memorandum on the “Radiation 
Reliability Assessment of the Hubble Space Telescope Electronics”, dated 28 
February 1998. This study identified potential TID concerns through 2010.  
However, this study reveals that only a portion (approximately 64%) of the 
integrated circuits (ICs) were reviewed from the total of 1120 semiconductor 
devices contained in the parts list.  The study does cite a number of ICs with 
probable degradation and potential TID issues in a number of electronic devices 
if not shielded in low dose areas of the vehicle.  In general, the report indicates 
that most devices fabricated during the HST development period are relatively 
immune to TID effects, but later electronic upgrades may be more susceptible.  
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Overall, this report provides incomplete evidence to support that the electronics 
are operating within TID specifications to the intended operational period of 
2008 or the end-of-life date of 2013.  The HST Parts Control Plan specifies a 
minimum TID of 15 KRads for generic parts and 5 KRads if generic data is 
unavailable.  Surface dose can exceed a MRad/year, but diminishes rapidly with 
shielding.   
 
As electronics devices accumulate total dose, device power increases due to 
transistor parameter shifts and eventually the devices will degrade beyond 
operational ranges. To date, there are no known HST electronics failures due to 
this mechanism, but the likelihood increases with TID accumulation.  
 
– Increasing thermal environment in the HST aft shroud due to higher power 
consuming equipment and increased instrument utilization. 
This condition appears to be a result of the installation and operation of more 
capable science instruments that consume more power, and not a result of MLI 
degradation.  The HST Program is performing ongoing analyses and expects to 
institute operational limitations to manage the thermal load. 
 
The proposed replacement of the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial 
Replacement (COSTAR) with the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) in the 
baseline robotic SM will increase thermal loading, as the COS is estimated to 
generate approximately 200 Watts versus the reported 45 Watts from COSTAR. 
  
– Review of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and hazard 
analyses for identification of single point failures. 
The HST Program reported that in preparation for the Power Control Unit 
(PCU) replacement during SM 3B, a review of the 1987 FMEA and hazard 
analyses was completed at the component and system levels.  This information 
was relayed late in the assessment period and represents a considerable quantity 
of additional reports only available though an internal GSFC document control 
system.  No comprehensive review was performed by the NESC team and will 
be forwarded as a recommendation to the HST Program for completion prior to 
a robotics SM Critical Design Review (CDR). 
 
– B-side electronics has not been exercised since prior to launch and has an 
assumed reliability of 1 and a failure rate equal to 10% of the operating 
value. 
The architectural design of the HST does not allow periodic verification of the 
redundant electronics circuitry without considerable disruption to science 
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operations and the potential risk to recovery of A-side operations.  Ground 
testing is assumed to have ensured the absence of latent defects in the electrical 
components and manufacturing.  However, the STIS has been the only system 
that required the use of the redundant electronics.  This assumed reliability 
represents the HST Program’s recognized systemic risk.  September 2002 is the 
most recent HST Program assessment of the effort involved to prepare, verify, 
and implement on-orbit testing of the HST’s redundant components.  It 
concluded verification of the B-side electronics was not recommended due to a 
number of factors that included a small, but non-zero, risk that one of the 
power-cycled modules would not restart. 
 
– Continued degradation of the MLI outer ply due to environmental 
exposure. 
Prior SMs observed a greater degradation than expected and implemented 
rudimentary fixes including application of New Outer Blanket Layer (NOBL) 
material to minimize material and thermal performance loss.  Increased damage 
is predicted during the next several years of solar minimum.  The potential for 
dislodged MLI becoming a contamination concern during future servicing 
requires assessment and mitigation. 
 
– A number of components have service exposure greater than design life. 
The contributing factors that have resulted in the exemplary success of a 
majority of components are understood from at least a qualitative standpoint.  
However, electrical and mechanical components cannot be expected to survive 
indefinitely.  Recognition of performance issues will continue to rely on 
telemetry for long-term health assessment.  Graceful failure modes with gradual 
precursor performance indicators cannot always be expected.  A structured Life 
Extension Initiative defined by the HST Program is a mechanism to explore 
anomaly detection, fault progression, and failure modes.  
Recommendations 
1.1 Continue the evaluation of recommendations on life prediction and battery 
capacity protocol identified in NESC Report, “Technical Consultation of the 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Nickel Hydrogen (NiH2) Battery Charge Capacity 
Prediction”, NESC 04-050-E, dated 17 June 2004. 
1.2 Assess the augmentation of GSFC baseline robotic SM to include replacement of 
at least one FGS. 
1.3 Complete planned ground testing to determine thermal margin limits of PSEA 
Safing computer prior to robotic SM CDR.  Update thermal warning high limits 
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or institute operational controls to limit temperature exposure to within allowable 
operational ranges.  If thermal limits can not be successfully raised, then assess 
potential for augmentation of GSFC baseline robotic SM to include replacement 
or redundant Safing computer. 
1.4 Locate and update, or generate, a comprehensive TID exposure analysis of HST 
components to identify any elements at risk to performance degradation for the 
intended operational period of 2008 and to the end-of-life date of 2013.  This 
analysis should be completed or updated prior to the robotic SM CDR. 
1.5 Release an operational plan to address aft shroud thermal environment conditions 
prior to the robotic SM CDR.  Update this plan to consider impact of de-orbit 
module attachment and the replacement instruments and components as part of 
any SM concept.  
1.6 Complete an updated review of the FMEA and hazard analyses for the 
identification of single point failures prior to the robotic SM CDR.  Assess the 
potential for augmentation of GSFC baseline robotic SM based on this review. 
1.7 Confirm thermal margins with respect to expected increased degradation of MLI 
outer ply prior to the robotic SM CDR. 
1.8 Identify contamination control protocol to mitigate risk of degraded MLI 
migration into internal structure of the HST during a SM.   
1.9 Pursue a structured Life Extension Initiative prioritized on component criticality. 
 
OPERATING CULTURE 
 
Observations 
• The HST Program appears to be a highly motivated and resourceful team with 
extensive corporate knowledge that has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to react to 
and plan for adverse conditions.  A number of innovation applications of HST 
systems to non-traditional roles are considered in fault planning.  This team has 
operations rooted in established procedures and a layered approach to anomaly 
recognition and disposition. 
 
• The HST Program team appears to practice an iterative SM versus End-of-Life 
paradigm. 
This manifests as data trending of performance parameters directed towards near-term 
problem recognition and characterization.  The HST team has the prerequisite skills 
and data available to make these predictions and this observation may be one of 
nomenclature.  However, clarification should be provided to the MOSES team on the 
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scope of their overall long-term telemetry/performance trending efforts. 
Recommendation 
2.1 Provide specific direction to HST Systems Engineers to complete end-of-life 
predictions for major components and subsystems with continuous updates from 
telemetry data and ground-based Life Extension Initiative results prior to the 
robotic SM CDR.   
 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
Observations 
• The reliability analysis updated by the Aerospace Corporation uses typical 
assumptions, failure rate updating, and modeling consistent with MIL-HDBK-
217 methodology.  
– Two methods were used to update the 1992 failure rate predictions.  First, the 
methodology (RADC-TR-85-229) developed by the Reliability Analysis 
Center is used to reduce the failure rate to 60% of the original MIL-HDBK-217 
failure rates.  This methodology is typically used by current satellite 
manufacturers.  The second update uses operational experience to adjust the 
HST subsystem failure rates.  By using a Bayesian methodology, the “a priori,” 
or original estimate, can be updated.  This methodology is also common in 
reliability engineering and Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs). 
• The current reliability analysis models only electronic failure rates with the 
exception of the RSU gyroscopes, where a mechanical wear out rate is applied. 
– The HST has many mechanical systems that should be modeled in the 
reliability analysis.  To perform a Bayesian update to include both HST 
electrical and mechanical components, shape and scale parameters and gamma 
distributions are required.  These values can be based on hardware experience 
and engineering estimations.  These refined parameters would then be used to 
adjust component failure rates.  Since there are many different types of 
subsystems in HST, the observed data accumulated over its life may be used to 
develop different shape parameters for each subsystem and then adjust each 
failure rate accordingly.  Following these failure rate adjustments, the models 
developed in the original HST Reliability Assessment could be used to more 
accurately represent the current and expected reliability of the HST. 
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• MIL-HDBK-217 unique analyses are intended to be a design trade tool and not 
an absolute estimate of component field (in-service) failures. 
Recommendations 
3.1 Update the reliability model from the August 2003 release to account for HST 
performance experience to date. 
3.2 Perform sensitivity studies on shape and scale parameters of current reliability 
analysis to determine if there is a change to the HST reliability drivers. 
3.3 Update the reliability analysis to incorporate shape and scale parameters and 
gamma distributions for the electrical and mechanical components using 
accumulated time and failures experienced during on-orbit operations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Orbiter SM4 
Planned Manifest 
 
Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) 
Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC 3) 
Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) 
Aft Shroud Cooling System 
Batteries 
Gyroscopes 
New Outer Blanket Layer (NOBL) 
Data Handling Cross Strap Unit (DSC) 
 
 
GSFC Baseline 
Robotic SM4 
Proposed Manifest 
 
Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) 
Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC 3) 
Batteries 
Gyroscopes 
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APPENDIX B 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
Ahr  AmpHour 
AOA  Analysis of Alternatives 
CDR  Critical Design Review 
COS  Cosmic Origins Spectrograph 
COSTAR  Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement 
DC  Direct Current 
DSC  Data Handling Cross Strap Unit 
FGS  Fine Guidance Sensor 
FMEA  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
GN&C  Guidance Navigation and Control 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center 
HQ  Headquarters 
HST  Hubble Space Telescope 
IC  Integrated Circuit 
IPAO  Independent Program Assessment Office 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LED  Light Emitting Diode 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
KDDL  Known Data Discrepancy List 
MLI  Multi-Layer Insulation 
MOSES Mission Operations, Systems Engineering, and Software 
NOBL  New Outer Blanket Layer 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
PCU  Power Control Unit 
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PSEA   Pointing/Safemode Electronics Assembly  
RSU  Rate Sensor Unit 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SM  Service Mission 
STIS  Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 
TID  Total Ionizing Dose 
TIM  Technical Interchange Meeting 
WFC  Wide Field Camera  
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APPENDIX C 
HST Program Reports and Briefings 
HST Program Reports and Briefings 
– Mission Operations, Systems Engineering, and Software Program Observatory Performance 
Assessment Quarterly Reports (June 2004, 2003, and 2001) 
– 26 July 2004, Mission Operations Snapshot 
– 15 July 2004, Mission Operations, Systems Engineering, and Software Program Quarterly 
Briefing 
– 22 June 2004, HST Survivability; Comparison of Servicing Tasks 
– 17 June 2004, Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Nickel 
Hydrogen (NiH2) Battery Charge Capacity Prediction, NESC 04-050-E 
– 10 June 2004, Known Data Discrepancy List (KDDL) 
– 9 June 2004, Comments on RSU being located on the De-orbit Module, EM HST-04-004A 
– 2 & 3 June 2004, Status of Hubble Spacecraft 
– 2 June 2004, Hubble Science Operations 
– 28 April 2004, Effect of WFPC3 Mechanism Disturbances on RGA and PCS, EM HST-04-
001A 
– 18 December 2003, Limited Life Items and Risk Mitigation List (SM-4) 
– 15 July 2003, Anomaly Reporting for HST Operations and Test 
– 9 September 2002, Impacts and Risks of On-Orbit Testing of HST’s Redundant Modules 
– 13 February 2002, HST Cargo Systems Manual 
– 2 August 2001, STIS Failure Review Board Final Report 
– 13 & 14 May 2004, HST Robotic Servicing Concept Review 
– 1 April 1997, HST Parts and Control Plan 
– 1991, The Flight Hardware and Ground System for HST Astrometry 
Aerospace Corporation Reliability Model 
– July 2002, HST Reliability Assessment, Report No. TOR-2003(2154)-2352 
– August 2003, Adjusted Reliability Model for Science Operations 
Independent Program Assessment Office (IPAO) Briefings  
– 21 through 24 June 2004, Briefings 
– 20 July 2004, Final Review Briefing 
Aerospace Corporation Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Briefing 
– 9 July 2004, Mid Term Briefing 
– 3 August 2004, Final Review Briefing 
Lockheed Martin Technical Memorandum TM12-97 
– 28 February 1998, Radiation Reliability Assessment of the Hubble Space Telescope 
Electronics 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) System Health Independent Technical Consultation 
Technical Interchange Meeting 
July 28-29, 2004 
Proposed Agenda 
Wednesday, July 28, 2004 
GSFC East, Building 33, Conference Room H118 
 
Time 
(EST) 
Topic/Activity Presenter/Participants 
8:30 Welcome, Safety/Emergency Procedures, 
Logistics, and Facility Information 
 
Gentz 
 
8:45 Assessment/Meeting Objective Gentz 
 
9:15 Initial Comments  
- Reliability 
- Mechanical Systems 
- Guidance, Navigation and Control 
- Power & Avionics 
- Scientific Payloads 
- Systems Engineering 
 
Team 
11:30 Lunch 
 
 
12:30 Travel to Lockheed Martin Corporation 
Facility 
7474 Greenway Center Drive 
Building 229, Suite 200 
301-901-6174 
 
Team 
 
 
 
 
13:00 Mission Operations, Systems Engineering, 
and Software (MOSES) Program Review 
- NESC Purpose and Introduction 
- CHAMP/MOSES HST Role 
- Data Management 
- Electrical Power 
- Mechanisms 
- Instrumentation & Communication 
 
 
 
Gentz 
Cruz 
Regalado 
Krol 
Mathews 
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- Optical Telescope Assembly 
- Science Instruments 
- Pointing Control/Sensor Calibration 
- Thermal 
- Safing  
- Operations (FOT, HSTARs, 
Briefings, etc.) 
- Systems Management 
 
Wynn 
 
Wenz 
Bassford/Heeler 
Smith 
 
Cottingham 
Myslinski 
Goulet 
 
Haskins 
15:30 Travel to GSFC, Building 33 
 
Team 
16:00 Working Session and Open Discussion 
 
Team 
17:00 Summary/Action Items/ Issues  
 
Gentz 
17:30 Adjourn 
 
 
Thursday, July 29, 2004 
GSFC East, Building 33, Conference Room H118 
 
Time 
(EST) 
Topic/Activity Presenter/Participants
8:30 Prior Days Review and Current Day Plan  
 
Gentz 
 
9:00 Carryover Topics from Wednesday 
Document Review and Open Discussion 
 
Team 
 
11:15 HST Program Office Discussion 
 
 
 
12:00 Lunch  
 
 
13:00 Code T Status Outline 
 
Team 
15:00 Open Discussion 
 
Team 
 
16:30 TIM Summary/Action Items  
 
Gentz 
17:30 Adjourn  
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APPENDIX E 
Interim Status Briefing to Admiral C. Steidle (August 3, 2004) 
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APPENDIX F 
 
HST Illustrations 
 
 High gain antenna
Aperture door
Secondary mirror 
Primary 
mirror 
Equipment 
Section 
Fine Guidance 
Sensor (3) 
Aft Shroud 
Axial Scientific 
Instruments 
Rate Sensor Units 
Solar Arrays 
Forward Shell 
and Light Shield 
 
Design Features of Support Systems Module 
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HST - Expanded View 
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OTA ELECTRONIC BOXES 
SUPPORT SYSTEMS MODULE 
  
Optical Telescope Assembly Components 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Consultation Position Paper 
Document #: 
RP-04-12 
 
Version #: 
1.0 
Title: 
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
System Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health 
Page #: 
34 of 34 
 
 
Approval and Document Revision History 
 
Approved: Original signed on file  9/16/04 
 NESC Director Date 
 
Version Description of Revision Office of Primary Responsibility Effective 
Date 
1.0 Initial Release Principal Engineers Office 08/24/04 
    
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
2.  REPORT TYPE 
Technical Memorandum
 4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) System 
Health Assessment – Analysis of HST Health
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
 6.  AUTHOR(S)
Gentz, Steven J.; Heard, Brent N.; Hodson, Robert F.; Pettit, Duane H.;
Pandolf, John E.; Azzolini, John D.; Dennehy, Cornelius J.; 
Farley, Rodger E.; Kirchman, Frank J.; and Spidaliere, Peter D.
 7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA  23681-2199
 9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC  20546-0001
 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
     REPORT NUMBER
L-19173
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
NASA
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
An electronic version can be found at http://ntrs.nasa.gov
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified - Unlimited
Subject Category  16
Availability:  NASA CASI (301) 621-0390
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
STI Help Desk (email:  help@sti.nasa.gov)
14. ABSTRACT
The NESC conducted an abridged independent examination of available information and personnel interviews to evaluate the 
current and anticipated state of the spacecraft subsystems and the parameters that describe the HST’s health. These 
examinations included the projected timeliness of a robotic SM and whether the GSFC baseline concept is likely to provide the 
capability to extend the useful scientific life of the HST by an additional 5 years. The NESC team collected a broad spectrum 
of pertinent HST Program analyses, reports, briefings, and the results of the IPAO and the Aerospace Corporation AOA 
assessments as they relate to the degradation of the HST’s health. This review included the state of the HST subsystems 
having the potential to impact the viability of the HST, but will not be serviced under the baseline robotic SM. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Battery capacity; GN&C; Health; HST; Life predictions; NESC; Nickel hydrogen batteries; Reliability analysis; Rate sensor 
unit; Servicing mission  
18. NUMBER
      OF 
      PAGES
39
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(301) 621-0390
a.  REPORT
U
c. THIS PAGE
U
b. ABSTRACT
U
17. LIMITATION OF 
      ABSTRACT
UU
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
3.  DATES COVERED (From - To)
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
104-08-33
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
      NUMBER(S)
NASA/TM-2005-213917
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 
shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1.  REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
09 - 200501-
